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Abstract
The structure of family business is unique compared to the non-family 
business as it combines three elements, namely, family relationships, 
composition of owners and management structure under the name of 
the business. This distinctive attribute often give rise to governance 
issues. Under the conventional concept of corporate governance, 
directors should act in the best interest of the shareholders. In doing 
so, the directors’ action is governed by certain rules which specify 
their duties and these rules are relevant to the shareholders with 
respect to their rights. Although there are laws which govern the 
relationship between the directors and shareholders, in certain 
circumstances there are some latent problems. These hidden 
problems can be identifi ed as the fault lines in the relationship 
between directors and shareholders. This article discusses the issues 
pertaining to fault lines which may arise in a family business due 
to the complex and overlapping structure between directors and 
shareholders in a family business. Research methodology applied in 
this research is mainly doctrinal analysis.
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Introduction
The structure of family business is unique compared to the non-
family business as it combines three elements together under the 
name of the business. The three elements are family relationships, 
composition of owners and management structure. These elements 
inter-mingle with one another and often give rise to governance 
issues. This paper intends to discuss one of the issues; the confl icts 
between ownership and control.
2Family Business
According to Chrisman, Chua and Sharma, there are 21 different 
defi nitions of family business in their review of 250 research 
articles.1 Generally, it refers to a business structure in which the 
ownerships, the management and the decision making power are 
retained and intended to be for the family members. The restrictions 
are structured as such from the beginning to establish a business 
legacy of the family name.
The Family Business Models
There are many models used in family business study. One of the 
models is the system theory model.2 According to this theory, the 
family fi rm is modeled as three overlapping and interdependent 
subsystems comprising of family, management and ownership. 
Each subsystem maintains boundaries that separate it from the other 
subsystem and the general external environment in which the family 
business operates.3 In order for the organization to perform at its 
utmost capacity, the subsystems must be integrated so that there is a 
unifi ed functioning of the whole system.4
The System Theory Model of Family Business5
Another model which is used to explain elements of family 
business is the three-circle model. This model is generally similar 
to the system theory model except that it replaces the element of 
management with the element of business. 
<?> Chrisman. J, Chua.J and Sharma. P, A Review and Annotated Bibliography 
of Family Business Studies, Boston, Kluwer, 1996. See also Ernesto J.Poza, 
Family Business, Thomson, SouthWestern, United States, 2007. 
2 Ernesto J.Poza, Family Business, Thomson, SouthWestern, United States, 2007 at 6.
3 Ibid. See also Alderfer.C, Change Process in Organizations, in M.Dunette, ed., 
Handbook of Industrial and Organizational Psychology, New York: Rand, 1976.
4 Above note 2. See also McCollum.M, Integration in the Family Firm.When the 
Family System Replaces Controls and Culture, Family Business Review, 1(4) 
1988 at pp 399-417.
5 Sources: Adapted from Gersick.K, Lansberg.I, Davis.J and Mc Collum.M, 
Generation to Generation, Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1997 and 
Churchill .N and Hatten.K, Non-Market Based Transfer Of Wealth And Power, 
American Journal of Small Business, 11(3), 1987 at pp 51-64 and Ernesto 
J.Poza, Family Business at p 7.
3The Three - Circle Model6
 
Under this model, everyone involved in a family business falls 
within one of the seven sectors created by the three circles. Numbers 
5, 6 and 7 refer to individuals who only have one connection with 
the business either as family member, owners or employed by 
the business. People who are involved in a single domain will 
probably have less knowledge of the other domains and may have 
different expectations.7 For example, a parent who is not involved 
in the business will tend to support the business without regard to 
that person’s qualifi cations and experiences and will tend to make 
decisions based on parental (or other family roles) rather than the 
6 Sources: Adapted from Renato Taguini And John Davis, Bivalent Attributes 
Of The Family Firm, 1982 and Peter Leach, Family Business. The essentials, 
profi le books, London, 2007 at p 42.
7 The Unique Character Of Family Business. Retrieved from  ttp://www.cfs.
purdue.edu/csr/ifb/family/character/html.  Retrieved on 12 February 2009.
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4basis of a business.8 Non-family employees are also single-domain 
individuals.9 They work for the company, but do not have the same 
interests as owners or family members.10 Their own hopes and dreams 
may confl ict with those of family employees, particularly when 
family employees are promoted or when family members discuss 
business issues at home, thus excluding non-family employees from 
the discussion.11
Numbers 2, 3 and 4 are in the double domain area. In the double 
domain area, the combination could be:
- Family + Business; this is commonly referring to employed 
family members, not owners.
- Family + Owner; this is commonly referring to family 
shareholders who do not work in the business.
- Business + Owner; this is commonly referring to employee 
shareholders.
The most important sector in the model is sector 1 which covers 
individuals who are family members, own shares and work in the 
business. This sector comes under the three domain area. Under this 
domain, all three components are overlapping; Family + Business + 
Ownership = family members involved in all three sectors.12 Family 
members who work in the business and owners are probably the most 
knowledgeable about the inherent workings of all three domains 
because they have more frequent and intimate interaction with all 
three domains. 13These individuals may have more responsibility 
and authority in the business.
The themes underpinning family business are relationships and their 
obligations and the values of reciprocity and respect.14 There are two 
main factors which justify the survival of family business:15
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid
11 Ibid
12 Ibid
13 Ibid.
14 Peter Sheldrake, Keeping business in the family, Business Asia, October 31, 
1999. Retrieved from http://www.fi ndarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0BJT/is_21 
_7/ai_57745787 on 1 September 2006.
15 Ibid.
5 Decisiveness in the marketplace which allows the companies 
to be aggressive and effective.
 The family ties/relationship ensures cohesiveness and trust 
that makes such companies formidable adversaries.
Nonetheless, despite its secured tenure in the market place, the 
expansion of family business faced two main threats.16 Firstly, the 
inability of succeeding generations to maintain the entrepreneurial 
spirit and success of the founders and secondly, the issue of 
sustainability.17 A family business is claimed to be able to expand 
only up to a certain size, and beyond that size, the enterprise can 
only operate effectively through the application of more universal 
rules, impersonal processes, and without reliance on individual links 
of kinship.18 BDO Canada  highlighted that only one-third of family-
owned businesses survive the transition to the second generation.19 
The issue of sustainability is actually the impetus behind this paper 
which meant to highlight the possible diversion of ownership in the 
course of expansion of the family business. 
Ernesto Poza highlighted that a simple business ownership is 
preferable because its ownership structure can work well for one 
generation.20 However, it can quickly turn dysfunctional in the 
next generation.21 He contended that successful family businesses 
often compete on speed and agility and as such, fi nding a suitable 
corporate structure is very important.22 A simple approach used by 
many family businesses is to separate the business from the family 
assets whereby only family members who are not active in the 
business get family assets, while those who work in the company get 
shares. Another useful approach applied in family businesses is to 
redesign the capital or ownership structure of the company whereby 
only those who are active in the company can own shares of the 
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 BDO Canada, Succession Planning for Family Business, http://www.bdo.ca/
library/publications/familybusiness/succession/planning1.cfm. Retrieved on 12 
January 2012.
20 Ernesto Poza, Family Business Succession Issues, BWSmallBiz -- Family Inc. 
October 17, 2008; hƩ p://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/08_70/
s0810038729083.htm. Retrieved on 12 January 2012
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
6company. In such ways, the third-generation family members who 
are retiring will have to sell their shares to members of the next 
generation. 23 
Malaysian Family Business
A report of a national survey covering 225 companies conducted by 
Grant Thornton and Malaysian Institute of Management in 2002,24 
stated that majority of family businesses in Malaysia is small scale 
enterprises and generally managed by the founder. Manufacturing, 
retailing or constructions are the notable sectors in which family 
business ventured most.25 It is also found that most of the family 
businesses were initiated by people having six years or more of 
work experience.26 The study indicates that in Malaysia, people with 
appropriate experience commenced family businesses.
The Report also underlines the characteristics of family business in 
Malaysia, which can be summarized as:
 59% of the business is still run by the founder and 30% are run 
by the second generation, the majority of whom are children 
of the founder;
 65% of small scale enterprises are managed by the founders;
 55% of family businesses in the small scale enterprises 
employ less than 51 persons;
 35% of family businesses in the medium scale enterprises 
employ between 51 - 250 persons;
 10% of family businesses from large scale enterprises employ 
more than 250 persons; and
 main activity of family business lies in manufacturing (35%), 
followed by retailing (12.9%) and construction (10%).
The Report also highlighted two main concerns in a family business 
structure: 
 Means to fi nance the business
 Involvement /Participation of family member
23 Ibid.
24 Shamsir Jasani, Report on Malaysia’s Family Business, The Family & The Business 
International Survey, Grant Thornton & Malaysian Institute of Management.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
7Although these two factors are seen to be distinct, in practice they 
are actually interrelated. In starting up, carrying out and expanding 
the business, often family business faced not only the challenge of 
getting suffi cient fi nancing but also the appropriate source of fi nance. 
The Report also recorded responses on outsiders’ participation in the 
family business.  It was found that only 39% of the respondents from 
the large scale business were concerned about outsiders coming into 
the business and take control of the business whilst in the medium 
scale businesses, 43% of the respondents expressed their concern 
about external participation in the family business. On top of that, 
44% of the respondents in the medium scale business expressed their 
worry over losing control if outsiders are allowed to be in the family 
business. The Report supports the rationale of this paper, i.e. that 
one of the main issues of concern in family business is the confl ict 
between control and ownership.   
                                                   
Control and Ownership
The dichotomy of control and ownership, which is the essence of 
directors-shareholders relationship, is the main spectrum of the fault 
lines between the owner and the management. Thus, it would be 
essential to elaborate the dichotomy of control and ownership in a 
company before discussing the fault lines evolving from it. 
Separation of control and ownership occurs in a situation where 
shares are widely dispersed or where the shareholders are not 
involved in management of the company. This situation would be 
inevitable in a public company. The shareholders who own shares 
in the companies are known as the owners whilst the directors who 
manage the companies are said to have control over the entities. Berle 
and Means discussed the concept of control and ownership in their 
book The Modern Corporation and Private Property27 whereby they 
averred that a greater dispersion of share ownership would cause a 
decrease of the shareholders’ power and interest in the company.28 
This is known as a separation of ownership from control. The 
writers argued that as a result of the separation of ownership from 
27 Adolf A. Berle & Gardiner C.Means, The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property, (New York, 1933).
28 Ibid, also in Edward S.Herman, Corporate Control, Corporate Power, 
(Cambridge University Press, 1981) at 5.
8control, shareholders would no longer have charge of the direction 
of the company and the directors are vested with wider power in 
developing the company.29 Consequently there will be a divergence 
of interest between the managers and owners in certain situation. 
According to Dr Saleem Sheikh and Professor SK Chatterjee:
The divergence of interest between ownership and 
control had created a division of functions. Within 
the corporation, shareholders had only interests in 
the enterprise while the directors had power over it. 
The position of the shareholders had been reduced to 
that of having a set of legal and factual interests in the 
enterprise.30
When there is a separation between the owners and the controllers in 
a company, there is a possibility that the interests of the shareholders 
would not be carried out since they have no control over the running 
of the company. In other words, such divergence would cause the 
company to depart from the traditional theory of profi t maximising 
behaviour.31 It appears that directors who are also the managers 
have the control, and would act towards maximisation of their own 
lifetime incomes.32 According to Edward S. Herman33 control relates 
to power which is ‘the capacity to initiate, constrain, circumscribe, 
or terminate action, either directly or by infl uence exercised on those 
with immediate decision-making authority.’34
Thus the directors might disregard the interests of the shareholders 
which should have been their paramount consideration. The directors 
may own some shares and such ownership is usually the result of 
the directors’ executive positions in the company.35 Therefore these 
29 Dr Saleem Sheikh and Prof SK Chatterjee, Perspectives on Corporate 
Governance, in Dr Saleem Sheikh and Prof William Rees(eds), Corporate 
Governance & Corporate Control, (Cavendish Publishing Limited, London, 
1995) at 38.
30 Ibid at 40.
31 Above note 2 at 41. Also in Monsen and Downs, A Theory of Large Managerial 
Firms, The Journal of Political Economy, (1965) Vol LXXIII, 221.
32 Above note 2, at 42.
33 Edward S.Herman, Corporate Control, Corporate Power, (Cambridge 
University Press, 1981) at 17
34 Above note 2, at 42.
35 Ibid
9directors who operate the business of the company are primarily 
motivated by their own self-interest, which may not coincide with 
the interest of the owners.36
Furthermore, the separation of ownership from control limited 
owners to being satisfi ers instead of maximisers.37 This means the 
shareholders will be satisfi ed with the dividend received without 
participating in the management of the company for the purpose 
of obtaining maximum profi t. When the owners lack control of the 
company, they become unfamiliar with the policies engaged by 
it.38 As a result, the managers may aim at achieving steady growth 
of earnings instead of maximising profi ts for the owners.39 This 
situation is known as shareholders passivity. Cohen Committee 
acknowledged that the lack of active participation from the 
shareholders was due to the separation of ownership from control.40 
Furthermore the dispersion of capital among an increasing number of 
small shareholders made them pay less attention to their investments 
and they are contented with the dividends which are forthcoming.41 
However the Cohen Committee averred the need for a separation of 
ownership from control:
Executive power must inevitably be vested in the 
directors and is generally used to the advantage of the 
shareholders. There are, however, exceptional cases in 
which directors of companies abuse their power and 
it is, therefore, desirable to devise provisions which 
will make it diffi cult for directors to secure the hurried 
passage of controversial measures…42
This is indeed true since not all shareholders have the knowledge to 
manage the business of the company and it will be more appropriate 
to leave management of the company to more qualifi ed persons 
36  These views have been objected by Herman who contended that his survey 
revealed that the broad objective of both large managerial and owner-dominated 
fi rms tended to be profi table growth and that motive has not been affected by 
the rise of control. 
37  Above note 2,at 42.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 In Board of Trade, Report of the Company Law Committee (1945) Cmnd 6659 
(Cohen Committee).
41 Ibid at 135.
42 Ibid.
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like the directors. The directors should therefore be treated as mere 
managers of the company and should manage the company in 
conformity with the policies approved by the shareholders.43 
Cohen Committee and Jenkins Committee have recommended 
disclosure of the company’s activity to remedy any possible abuse of 
powers by the directors. The latter had also agreed that the existence 
of separation of control from ownership was essential for the general 
good of the company.44 The report in Jenkins Committee focused 
more on the directors’ powers and shareholders’ control. It appears 
that Jenkins Committee was concerned with the issue whether 
shareholders who contribute the equity of a company should really 
be involved in the management of that company and the directors 
should perform their duties without being involved in the ownership 
of the company to avoid any confl ict of interest.45 In other words 
the separation of ownership from control is something inevitable, 
but the directors should not abuse the control and the shareholders 
should be allowed to monitor it only to a certain extent so as not 
to interfere with the directors’ freedom i.e. to do what they think 
best in the interest of the company. This is supported by Lipton and 
Rosenblum46 who viewed that the relationship between managers 
and shareholders is problematic in the modern public company and 
there should be a system where these two parties may work co-
operatively towards the company’s long-term success.
General Power to Manage
Generally, companies adopt article 73 of Table A47 in their articles of 
association. The article provides:
The business of the company shall be managed by 
the directors who may… exercise all such powers 
of the company as are not, by the Act or by these 
regulations, required to be exercised by the company in 
43 Above note 2, at 10.
44 Ibid and above note 13.
45 Above note 2, at 11.
46 Above note 2 at 45. Refer also Lipton and Rosenblum, A New System 
of Corporate Governance: The Quinquennnial Election of Directors, The 
University of Chicago Law Review (1991) 87.
47 Fourth Schedule, Companies Act 1965 (Malaysia).
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general meeting, subject, nevertheless, to any of these 
regulations, to the provisions of the Act, and to such 
regulations, being not inconsistent with the aforesaid 
regulations or provisions, as may be prescribed by the 
company in general meeting…
There are two main points in this article. The fi rst limb prescribes 
the directors’ general power to manage a company whilst the second 
limb explains the limitations to that power. The former indicates 
that if the management of a company is vested with the directors, 
the members i.e. the shareholders may not give instruction to the 
directors or override their decision.48 Harman J. in Breckland Group 
Holdings Ltd v London Suffolk Properties Ltd & Ors49confi rmed 
that the powers of the board of directors are independent of the 
shareholders and further held:
The principle, as I see it, is that the article confi des the 
management of the business to the directors and in such 
a case it is not for the general meeting to interfere...If 
the board does not adopt it, a general meeting would 
have no power whatever to override that decision of 
the board and to adopt it for itself.50
The second limb provides limitation regarding directors’ power to 
manage had been subject to certain argument. The majority viewed 
that directors have autonomous powers to manage the company and 
they were against any interference by the owners in managing the 
company.51 Those agreed with this view are more inclined to leave 
matters relating to the management of the company in the hands 
of the directors.  On the other hand, in certain cases shareholders 
48 Walter Woon, Company Law, Second Edition, (FT Law & Tax Asia Pacifi c, 
1997) at 142.
49 [1989] BCLC 100.
50  Ibid at 106. 
51 Refer cases like Automatic Self-Cleansing Syndicate Co Ltd v Cunninghame 
[1906] 2 Ch 34, John Shaw & Sons (Salford) Ltd v Shaw [1935] 2 KB 113, Dato 
Mak Kok & Ors v See Keng Leong & Ors(1990) 1 MSCLC 90,357, NRMA v 
Parker (1986) 4 ACLC 609,Queensland Press Ltd v Academy Instrument(No 3) 
Pty Ltd (1987) 11 ACLR 419.
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are allowed to interfere to limit the directors’ powers to manage.52 
However, this view had not been taken up or developed, and had 
even been ignored.
Refusal to Register Transfer of Shares
Section 98 of the Companies Act 1965 provides that shares of any 
member in a company shall be movable property, transferable in the 
manner provided by the articles of association. However, the right of 
a shareholder to transfer his shares would be subject to restrictions 
in the Companies Act 1965 and also in the articles of association.53 
Though these restrictions are meant primarily for the private 
companies,54 it would be relevant to discuss the issues since family 
owned companies are commonly formed as private companies.
Restriction to transfer shares could be in the form of Article 22 of 
Table A55 where directors may decline to register any transfer of 
shares to a person whom they do not approve of or which the company 
has a lien. However, most companies provide for restrictions in their 
articles of association which go beyond the restrictions in Article 
22. For instance in Re Smith & Fawcett Ltd56 the article provided 
that “the directors may at any time in their absolute discretion and 
uncontrolled discretion refuse to register any transfer of shares.” The 
Court of Appeal in this case accepted the restrictions as provided in 
the above article and added that it would not be necessary for the 
directors to give reasons. The above decision was later reinforced 
in the Malaysian case of Kesar Singh v Sepang Omnibus Co Ltd.57
52  Refer Marshall’s Valve Gear Co Ltd v Manning Wardle & Co Ltd [1909] 1 
Ch 267, Credit Development Pte Ltd v IMO Pte Ltd [1993] 2 SLR 370, D 
Goldberg, Article 80 of Table A of the Companies Act 1948, Modern Law 
Review, [1970] Vol 33, 177 at 178. G. R. Sullivan, The Relationship between 
the Board of Directors and The General Meeting In Limited Companies, The 
Law Quarterly Review ,[1977] Vol 93, 569 at 572. Ronald Choo Han Woon, 
Division of Powers Between the General Meeting and the Board of Directors in 
a Company, Singapore Academy Law Journal, (1995) 360 at 362.
53 Refer section 15 of the Companies Act 1965.
54 It should be noted that in Four Seas Enterprise Corporation Sdn. Bhd v Yap 
Tean Cheong [1995] 1 LNS 273, Zakaria M Yatim J mentioned that non-listed 
public company may impose restrictions on the right of transfer if its articles of 
association so provide.
55 Fourth Schedule, Companies Act 1965 (Malaysia).
56  [1942] 1 All ER 542. 
57 (1964) 30 MLJ 122.
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 In the above circumstances directors are left with wide discretion 
and absolute power to refuse to register a transfer of shares. When 
the directors were empowered by the article with “absolute discretion 
and unlimited power and without assigning any reasons” to refuse 
the registration of any shares, they can be said to have a veto power 
on that matter and would be diffi cult for anybody not even the 
owners (i.e. the shareholders) of the company to challenge it. The 
unlimited power to refuse to register the transfer of shares exercised 
by the directors may affect directors-shareholders relationship.
Nevertheless the exercise of such power by the directors is limited 
by their fi duciary duty to act  bona fi de in the best interests of 
the company as pointed out by Lord Greene MR in Re Smith & 
Fawcett Ltd58. This means unsatisfi ed shareholders may challenge 
the directors’ action by proving mala fi de. However as averred by 
M.T. Lazarides,59 bad faith is diffi cult to be proved in the absence of 
a requirement to give reasons (for the refusal to register transfer of 
shares). It is only when reasons are given, either required or not, the 
court will examine its legitimacy. In Lim Ow Goik & Anor v Sungei 
Merah Bus Co Ltd, the court had examined the reasons given 
though it was not required and held that it was an improper exercise 
of power by the directors. Also in Re Bells Bros Ltd, Chitty J. had 
ordered for the registration of the proposed transfer since the reason 
given was not justifi able. In this case the directors refused to register 
a transfer on the grounds that the transferee was not a member of the 
Bell family and the court considered that the directors, in rejecting 
the transfer based on the policy of keeping shares within the family 
had exercised the power on a wrong principle and for a reason not 
within the legitimate purposes of their power. 
In the absence of the requirement to provide reasons for the refusal 
to register a transfer of shares by the directors, the rights of the 
shareholders might be jeopardized. To leave the directors with 
absolute power and uncontested discretion would be unfair to the 
58 Above note 29. Lord Greene MR held that ‘In the present case the article 
is drafted in the widest possible terms, and I decline to write into that clear 
language any limitation other than a limitation, which is implicit by law, that a 
fi duciary power of this kind must be exercised bona fi de in the interests of the 
company.’
59 M.T. Lazarides, Directors’ Powers in Relation to Transfers of Shares, ICCLR, 
[1994] Vol 7 252 at 256.
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shareholders who own the company. Thus appropriate provisions 
would be necessary to balance the absolute power given to the 
directors who control the company.
Power to File Winding Up Petition
A company may be wound up by way of voluntary winding up 
or compulsory winding up. According to Section 217(1)(a) of the 
Companies Act 1965, compulsory winding up needs to be initiated 
by a petition fi led by the company concerned. However, the provision 
is silent on whether the shareholders’ approval is necessary before 
a company fi les a winding up petition. In other words, the word 
‘company’ stated in that provision is unclear. Thus it refer to the 
board of directors or the shareholders or both? The interpretation 
on that issue is given by case laws and it can be divided into two 
i.e. those which require the shareholders’ sanction and those which 
do not. Some of the Australian cases like In re Standard Bank of 
Australia60 and In re Birmacley Products Pty Ltd61, the courts held 
that it was necessary to obtain the shareholders’ approval before 
a petition to wind up a company could be made. In coming to 
this decision the courts referred to the old English case of Smith 
v Duke of Manchester62 where Bacon VC held that on such an 
important question of whether a company should be destroyed or 
not, the shareholders should have a right to express their views. In 
re Standard Bank of Australia63, Hodges J in discussing about who 
would fi le for a winding up petition, had elaborated that the article 
which rendered powers to the directors to manage the business of 
the company did not include the power to destroy the company. 
Therefore before fi ling for a winding up petition, the directors must 
fi rst obtain the shareholders’ consent.
On the other hand, cases like Re Inkerman Grazing Pty Ltd64, Spicer 
& Anor v Mytrent Pty Ltd & Ors65 and Re New England Agricultural 
Corporation Ltd66, allowed the directors in the absence of the 
60 (1898) 24 V.L.R. 304.
61 [1942] A.L.R. 276.
62 [1883] 24 Ch D 611.
63 Above note 62 at 306.
64 (1972) 1 ACLR 102.
65 (1984) 2 ACLC 214.
66 (1982) 1 ACLC 557.
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shareholders’ sanction to fi le a winding up petition. Street J in Re 
Inkerman Grazing Pty Ltd67 viewed that directors have the power 
to fi le a winding up petition on behalf of the company by virtue of 
Article 73 of Table A (which discussed about directors’ power to 
manage the company) and during fi nancial crisis it would be justifi ed 
for the directors to resolve to that procedure without seeking the 
approval of the shareholders.
In Malaysia, VC George in the case of Miharja Development Sdn 
Bhd  & 8 Ors v Loy Hean Heong & 9 Ors68 followed the decision of 
Street J. in Re Inkerman Grazing Pty Ltd.69 According to the learned 
trial judge, the effect of and the practice in respect of Section 217(1)
(a) of the Companies Act 1965 was that the directors of a company 
may petition for the winding up of a company without obtaining the 
sanction of the shareholders. According to Choong Yeow Choy this 
should not be conclusive since it was only a High Court decision 
and the court in construing the articles of association of a company 
should be mindful of the fact that the shareholders as owners of the 
company should have a say in a crucial decision like winding up.70 
Loh Siew Cheang71 who disagreed with the reasoning given in Re 
Inkerman Grazing Pty Ltd72 and Spicer & Anor  v Mytrent Pty Ltd 
& Ors73, opined that directors as persons who manage the fi nancial 
affairs of the company might be the ones who trigger the company’s 
fi nancial crisis and it is not right to let them wind up the company 
without consulting the shareholders.74 
The above are examples of the fault lines which may occur in family 
owned companies. These fault lines are the result of the ambiguity 
concerning the locus of certain powers in a company. Failure to 
resolve them may affect the standard of corporate governance that 
may cause the collapse of the company in the long term.
67 Above note 66 at 106.
68 [1995] 1MLJ 101.
69 Above note 66.
70 Choong Yeow Choy, Who has the right to terminate the life of a company- 
shareholders or the board of directors?, The Company Lawyer (1996) Vol 17 No 
2, at 64.
71 In Corporate Powers- Control, Remedies and Decision-making (Malayan Law 
Journal, Sdn. Bhd, Kuala Lumpur, 1996) at 16.
72 Above note 66.
73 Above note 67.
74 Above note 48.
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Conclusion
The separation of ownership from control would result in the 
directors or managers more dominant than the owners or the 
shareholders. The defi nite meaning of the provisions concerning 
control and management is essential to ensure that the directors will 
not abuse their authority and powers. It is necessary to determine 
whether or not the power is absolute and whether or not it allows 
for interference and control by the shareholders. It is also necessary 
to determine whether the shareholders are allowed to interfere in 
the management of the company and if so, to what extent this may 
affect the power of directors. If not alleviated, these fault lines may 
disrupt the corporate governance of a company. Since separation of 
ownership from control is obscure in family owned companies, the 
practices of corporate governance principles, such as accountability 
and disclosure are essential to formulate an acceptable standard of 
transparency as a means of check and balance between directors and 
shareholders.
